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Abstract. The postulate ofRecovery, among the six postulates for theory contraction, formulated
and studied by Alchourrón, G̈ardenfors and Makinson is the one that has provoked most controversy.
In this article we construct withdrawal functions that do not satisfyRecovery, but try to preserve
minimal change, and relate these withdrawal functions with the AGM contraction functions.
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1. Introduction
The postulate ofRecovery, among the six postulates for theory contraction, for-
mulated and studied by Alchourrón, G̈ardenfors and Makinson (Alchourrón and
Makinson, 1982, 1985; Alchourrón et al., 1985; Makinson, 1987; Gärdenfors, 1988)
is the one that has provoked most controversy (Makinson, 1987, 1996; Hansson,
1991, 1993; Nayak, 1994).
There are clearly cases in which the recovery postulate seems to be contrary
to intuition. Basically, proposed counter-examples reduce to the following one
(Hansson, 1993):
LetK be a theory, and letx; y 2 K. Suppose we wish to eliminatex andy;
and do so by contracting their disjunctionx _ y. If later on we are informed
that eitherx or y is actually true, without being told which one is true, we
shall expand our beliefs byx_y. After performing the expansion as sanctioned
by the AGM model, the resulting set will restore the whole ofK and thus in
particular bothx andy, contrary to what is expected.
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The problem appears because when we contractK by x _ y, by recovery the
sentence(x _ y)! (x ^ y) must remain in the result of the contraction.
Contraction functions without recovery have been dubbedwithdrawal functions
(Makinson, 1987).
This note does not attempt to settle the question of the acceptability of the
recovery postulate. Its purpose is to define a sensiblewithdrawal functionover
theories and to establish its connection with AGM revision functions. Our desire
is to retain much as possible of the previous theory, but remove the sentences that
provoke non-intuitive results.
Another well known point should be recalled: When dealing with standard
AGM functions, the Levi and Harper identities allow for the interdefinability of
contraction and revision functions. As a direct consequence, we can take either of
the two as primitive. There is no identity that takes us from revision to contraction
without recovery such as the Harper identity. We will give the connection with
AGM revision through an identity similar to the Harper identity.
We recall that in (Hansson and Olsson, 1995), Hansson and Olsson characterized
the Levi contractions that satisfy all basic AGM postulates exceptR covery. But,
this is a quite general withdrawal function and not an attempt to preserve any kind
of minimal change.
We also recall that in his discussion of examples like the one above, Fuhrmann
(1991) proposed meeting them by imposing the following “filtering condition:”
“If y has been retracted from a base B in order to bar derivations of x from
B, then the contraction of Cn(B) by x should not contain any sentences which
were in Cn(B) “just because” y was in Cn(B).”
However, this work and later (Williams, 1994; Rott, 1995; Makinson, 1996) use
this condition when dealing withbases. Then it is necessary to find a conceptual
mechanism like the filtering condition to operate with theories, which in effect is
what we propose in this paper.
In Section 2 we present the AGM functions. In Section 3 we develop contraction
functions, for theories, that do not satisfy the recovery postulate. In Section 4 we
relate these contraction functions with the AGM revision functions.
2. Background: The AGM Account (Alchourr ón et al., 1985;
Gärdenfors, 1988)
In this account the beliefs of a rational agent are represented by a belief set
K and closed under logical consequenceCn, whereCn satisfies the following
properties:K  Cn(K) for any setK of propositions,Cn(Cn(K))  Cn(K)
andCn(K)  Cn(H) whenK  H . We assume thatCn includes classical
logical consequence, satisfies the rule of introduction of disjunction into premises,
and is compact. We writè x if x 2 Cn(;) andx  y if x$ y 2 Cn(;).
A theory is understood to be any setK of propositions closed underCn, i.e.
whereCn(K) = K.
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Let L be the set of all the sentences of the language. LetK be the set of all
theories. Formally, we define the expansion function+ from K  L to K, where
(K+x)denotes the expansion ofKbyxand is defined by(K+x) = Cn(K[fxg).
The six basic postulates for contraction are:
(K  1) K  x is a theory wheneverK is a theory (closure)
(K  2) K  x  K (inclusion)
(K  3) If x 62 Cn(K), thenK  x = K (vacuity)
(K  4) If x 62 Cn(;), thenx 62K  x (success)
(K  5) If x$ y 2 Cn(;) thenK  x = K  y (preservation)
(K  6) K  (K  x) + x wheneverK is a theory (recovery).
Clearly from(K  2) and(K  6) every contraction function satisfies the fol-
lowing property:
PROPOSITION 1.WheneverK is a theory, ifx 2 K , thenK = (K   x) + x.
In Alchourrón et al. (1985) and G̈ardenfors (1988) we see that ifK is a theory then
the functionsK   x = \S(K ? x), calledPartial Meet Contraction Functions,
fully characterize the contraction functions that satisfy(K  1)  (K  6); where
K ? x is the set of all inclusion-maximal subsetsA ofK such thatx is not a logical
consequence ofA, S is a selection function, such thatS(K ? x) is a non-empty
subset ofK ? x, unless the latter is empty, in which caseS(K ? x) = fKg.
The six basic postulates for revision are:
(K  1) K  x is a theory (closure)
(K  2) x 2 K  x (success)
(K  3) K  x  K+ x (inclusion)
(K  4) If :x =2 K thenK+ x  K  x (vacuity)
(K  5) K  x = K? iff :x 2 Cn(;) (consistency)
(K  6) If x$ y 2 Cn(;) thenK  x = K  y (preservation).
2.1. RELATION BETWEEN CONTRACTION AND REVISION
We have seen that contraction and revision are defined by two different sets of
postulates. These postulates are independent in the sense that the postulates of
revision do not refer to contraction and vice versa. However it is possible define
revision functions in terms of contraction functions, and vice versa, by means of
the formulas of Levi and Harper respectively.
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DEFINITION 1 (Makinson, 1987). LetK be a theory, then Levi is the function
such that for every operator  for K, Levi( ) is the operator forK such that for
all x:
K(Levi( )x) = (K  :x) + x
DEFINITION 2 (Makinson, 1987). LetK be a theory, then Harper is the function
such that for every operator forK, Harper() is the operator forK such that for
all x:
K(Harper()x) = K \K  :x
THEOREM 1 (Alchourŕon et al., 1985; Makinson, 1987).Let K be a theory and
 an operator forK that satisfies the contraction postulates(K 1) (K 5). Then
Levi( ) is an operator forK that satisfies the revision postulates(K 1)  (K 6).
Note that postulate (K  6) is not needed in this theorem.
THEOREM 2 (Alchourŕon et al., 1985; Makinson, 1987).Let K be a theory and
 an operator forK that satisfies the revision postulates(K  1)   (K  6). Then
Harper() is an operator forK that satisfies the contraction postulates(K   1) 
(K   6).
In Makinson (1987), Makinson proves the following results:
THEOREM 3.Let K be a theory and  an operator forK that satisfies the
contraction postulates(K   1)  (K   6). ThenHarper(Levi( )) =  .
THEOREM 4.LetK be a theory and an operator forK that satisfies the revision
postulates(K  1)  (K  6). ThenLevi(Harper()) = .
3. How to Construct a Contraction Function without Recovery
We can ask first why a contraction function satisfies recovery. The answer is the
following:
DEFINITION 3. LetV (x) = fx! y : y 2 K=K xg, where  is apartial meet
contraction function.
OBS. 1.V (x)  K  x
We see clearly that the contraction function satisfies recovery because all the
members ofV (x) are inK   x. But there are some cases where we do not wish
to retain all the members ofV (x) (see the example in the introduction) although
partial meet contractioncannot eliminate any of them. We need a function that
preserves minimal change and allows to remove the undesirable elements ofV (x).
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DEFINITION 4. LetL be the set of all the sentences of the language. LetK be
the set of all theories. A functions : KL is a semi-contraction function iff there
is a contraction function  (satisfying postulates(K 1)  (K 6)) such that for
allK inK andx 2 L:
K s x = K  x \K  w(x);
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K  x).
Here, Sel(K=K   x) selects an element ofK=K   x; this is equivalent to
selecting some finite subset ofK=K x, because if two sentences are inK=K x,
their conjunction is inK=K x too (the demonstration is trivial). IfK=K x = ;,
then Sel(K=K  x) is put asx.
In the example of the introduction, we do not want to recoverx^y when addx_y.
We achieve this by using a semi-contraction function:
K s (x _ y) = K  (x _ y) \K  ((x _ y)! (x ^ y))
THEOREM 5.K s x defined as Definition 4 satisfies(K   1)  (K   5).
THEOREM 6.K s x defined as Definition 4 fails to satisfy(K   6) iff x ! y 62
Cn(;).
COROLLARY 1. Let K be a theory and  an operator forK . If   satisfies
(K   1)  (K   6) then  is a semi-contraction function.
DEFINITION 5 (Failure) (Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1995). LetK be a theory and
  an operator forK.K  x satisfiesFailure iff K  x = K whenx 2 Cn(;).
We recall the well known fact:
OBS. 2.LetK be a theory and  an operator forK. If K x satisfies(K 1),
(K  2) and(K  6) then it satisfies Failure.
COROLLARY 2. K s x defined as Definition 4 satisfies Failure.
COROLLARY 3. LetK be a theory,  an operator forK that satisfies the contrac-
tion postulates(K   1)  (K   6), ands an associated semi-contraction function
defined as in Definition 4. Ifs satisfies(K   6) then for allx K s x = K   x.
We can ask ourselves if the semi-contraction functions characterize the withdrawal
functions thatFailure. The answer is no as we can see in the following counter-
example:
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LetK = Cn(fa; b; cg) : a; b; c 2 L
Let be defined as:
K  x =
8>>><
>>:
K if x 62 K
Cn(fbg) if x  a
Cn(fa; y ! b ^ cg) if x  a! y;8y 2 K
Cn(;) otherwise
It is trivial to show thatK  x satisfies(K   1)   (K   5) andFailure. We
show thatK  x cannot be defined as a semi-contraction function.
Suppose that is a semi-contraction function defined as in Definition 4. Let 
be a contraction function forK that satisfies(K  1)  (K  6), such that:
K  x = K  x \K  (x! y); y 2 K=K  x
Then in particular,
K  (a! y) = K  (a! y) \K  ((a! y))! z;
z 2 K=K  (a! y); y 2 K
(K  (a! y)) + (a! y) = K (by def. of)
z 2 (K  (a! y)) + (a! y)
then(a! y)! z 2 K  (a! y) (by (K  1))
then(a! y)! z 2 K  ((a! y))! z
then ` (a! y)! z (by (K  3))
thenK  ((a! y)! z) = K (by Failure)
soK  (a! y) = K  (a! y)
K  a = K  a \K  (a! w); w 2 K=K  a
K  a = K  a \K  (a! w)
K  a = K  a \ Cn(fa;w ! b ^ cg)
K  a does not satisfy(K  6), soa 6` w
Now b 62 Cn(fa;w ! b ^ cg)
sob 62 K  a; contradicting the def. of.
So we have reached a clear contradiction, from the supposition that is a
semi-contraction function.
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4. Relation betweens and 
As the Levi and Harper functions for the AGM model, we need to define new
functions to relates and. To define in terms of a semi-contractions we can use
the Levi identity (see Definition 1), i.e.,
K(Levi(s)) x = (K s :x) + x
However, to define a semi-contractions in terms of we need a new identity:
DEFINITION 6. LetK be a theory, then Harper0 is the function such that for every
operator forK, Harper0() is the operator forK such that for allx:
K(Harper0())x = K \K  :x \K  :w(x);
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K \K  :x) = Sel(K=K  :x)
THEOREM 7.LetK be a theory,  an operator forK that satisfies the contraction
postulates(K 1) (K 6), ands an associated semi-contraction function defined
as Definition 4. ThenLevi(s) = Levi( ).
COROLLARY 4. Levi(s) satisfies(K  1)  (K  6).
THEOREM 8.LetK be a theory and an operator forK that satisfies the revision
postulates(K  1)   (K  6). ThenHarper0 is an operator forK that satisfies the
contraction postulates(K   1)  (K   5).
THEOREM 9.LetK be a theory,  an operator forK that satisfies the contraction
postulates(K 1) (K 6), ands its associated semi-contraction function defined
as Definition 4. ThenHarper0(Levi(s)) = s.
THEOREM 10.LetK be a theory and an operator forK that satisfies the revision
postulates(K  1)  (K  6). ThenLevi(Harper0()) = .
5. Conclusions
We have defined a contraction function without recovery applicable to theories.
We have obtained this function as a combination of two applications of a single
standard AGM contraction function.We have related our withdrawal functions with
the classical AGM revision functions through the Levi and Harper0 identities and
finally have shown that they become reciprocally dual.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Obs. 1
Suppose thaty 2 K andy 62 K  x
thenK 6= K  x
thenx 2K (by (K  3))
theny 2 (K  x) + x (by (K  6))
hencex! y 2K  x.
Proof of Theorem 5
(K  1) , (K  2) are trivial.
(K  3): Suppose thatx 62 K
thenK  x = K (by (K  3))
thenK=K  x = ;
thenK  w(x) = K  (x! x) (by Definition 4)
thenK  w(x) = K (by Theorem 2)
henceK s x = K  x \K  w(x) = K \K = K:
(K  4) is trivial.
(K  5) is trivial sinceK=K  x = K=K  y (by (K  5)).
Proof of Theorem 6
() Suppose thatK s x satisfies(K  6), i.e.,K  (K s x) + x
a) IfK=K  x = ;
theny = x (by Definition 4)
hencey 2 Cn(fxg) (by Definition ofCn).
b) If K=K  x 6= ;
theny 2 K (by Definition 4)
theny 2 (K s x) + x (by (K  6))
thenx! y 2K s x
thenx! y 2K \K  (x! y) (by Definition 4)
thenx! y 2K  (x! y)
hencex! y 2 Cn(;) (by (K  4)).
)) Suppose thatx! y 2 Cn(;)
thenK  (x! y) = K (by Theorem 2)
thenK s x = K  x \K = K  x, that satisfies(K  6).
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Proof of Obs. 2
Let x 2 Cn(;)
K = (K  x) + x (by (K  6)), so
K = K  x (by (K  2))
Proof of Corollary 2
Trivial, sinces satisfies(K  2) and(K  6)
Proof of Corollary 3
Suppose thats satisfies(K  6)
thenx! y 2 Cn(;) (by Theorem 6)
thenK  (x! y) = K (by Failure)
thenK s x = K  x \K = K  x
Proof of Theorem 7
K(Levi(s))x = (K s :x) + x (by Definition of Levi)
= (K  :x \K  w(:x)) + x (by Definition 4)
= (K  :x) + x \ (K  w(:x)) + x
= (K  :x) + x \ (K  w(:x)) + (x ^ w(:x))
(sincex  x ^ w(:x))
= (K  :x) + x \ ((K  w(:x)) + w(:x)) + x
= (K  :x) + x \K+ x
(by Proposition 1, becausew(:x) 2 K)
= (K  :x) + x
= K(Levi( ))x (by Definition of Levi).
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K \K  :x) = Sel(K=K  :x).
Proof of Theorem 8
K(Harper0())x = K \K  :x \K  :w(x)
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K \K  :x)
(by Definition of Harper0)
= (K \K  :x) \ (K \K  :w(x))
= K  x \K  w(x)
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K  x)
(by definition of Harper),
that satisfies(K  1)  (K  5) (by Theorem 5).
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Proof of Theorem 9
K(Harper0(Levi(s)))x = K \K(Levi(s)):x \K(Levi(s)):w(x)
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K \K(Levi(s)):x)
(by Definition of Harper0)
= K \ (K  x) + :x \ (K  w(x)) + :w(x)
wherew(x) = x! y; y = Sel(K=K  x)
(by Definition of Levi)
= (K \ (K  x) + :x) \ (K \ (K  w(x)) + :w(x))
= K  x \K  w(x) (by Theorem 3)
= K s x (by Definition 4).
Proof of Theorem 10
K(Levi(Harper0())x = (K(Harper0()):x) + x (by Definition of Levi)
= (K \K  x \K  :w(:x)) + x
wherew(:x) = :x! y; y = Sel(K=K \K  x)
(by Definition of Harper0)
= K+ x \ (K  x) + x \ (K  :w(:x)) + x
= K+ x \K  x \K? (since:x 2 K  :w(:x))
= K  x (by (K  3)).
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